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‘It’s what Emmeline Pankhurst would have wanted’:   
Celebrity Big Brother: Year of the Woman (2018, UK) and negotiations of popular 
feminism(s) 
Abstract 
Feminist scholarship has invested attention in popular culture as a terrain upon which 
understandings of feminism are circulated, contested and explored. This is particularly so in 
the contemporary moment in which feminism appears to have achieved a new ascendency. 
But whilst popular culture and feminism are recognised as inextricably enmeshed, there 
remains the implicit or explicit assumption in feminist scholarship that popular media culture 
could do ‘better’, and that there is a more ‘authentic’ form of feminism waiting to find 
representation. In response to this context, this article undertakes an analysis of Twitter 
responses to Celebrity Big Brother: Year of the Woman (2018) in order to explore the ways in 
which a popular media text provides an arena for the negotiation of popular feminism. Rather 
than positioning reality TV and celebrity culture as a site of ‘ideological ruin’ for feminism, 
this article explores how CBB is discussed in relation to feminism as popular television, and 
the ways in which this may offer affordances and limitations. The article concludes that 
feminist media scholars need to give due attention to the complexities of popular feminism as 
articulated by popular media culture.  
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‘It’s what Emmeline Pankhurst would have wanted’:   
Celebrity Big Brother: Year of the Woman (2018, UK) and negotiations of popular 
feminism(s) 
Not gonna lie I'd much prefer a bunch of young trashy reality stars talking about 
how many lads they shagged or how many times they pissed their knickers on a 
night out than fucking POLITICS! Not for me #CBB (2 January, 2018). 
 
Dapper Laughs, the man that was pulled from TV as result of telling a member of 
his audience that she was 'gagging for a rape' is entering the #CBB Year Of  The 
Woman special. Oh, the sweet, sweet irony (4 January, 2018). 
 
I love all the debates and enlightening conversations we’re having about gender 
roles and identity #CBB #CBBBOTS #TIMESUP #GenderIdentity (9 January, 
2018).  
 
In January 2018, the UK version of Celebrity Big Brother (CBB) (2001-, UK) was launched 
as the ‘Year of the Woman’, and it began its run with 8 female contestants and an all-female 
studio audience. The programme claimed to hinge its theme on the 100th anniversary of 
(some)i women getting the right to vote, although it was clearly also responding to a media 
landscape in which feminism had achieved a ‘new luminosity’ (Gill, 2016: 614) – especially 
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in terms of its intersections with celebrity culture (Hamad and Taylor, 2015).  Referred to 
variously as a ‘zeitgeist’ (Gill, 2016), a fourth wave (Rivers, 2017) or a ‘remarkable… 
surge… in popular feminism’ (Banet-Weiser and Portwood-Stacer, 2017: 884), what appears 
to be the increased visibility of popular feminism has attracted both scholarly and popular 
attention, although there is a question here about whether the contours of this debate are 
fundamentally ‘new’. Indeed, as the tweets above suggest, CBB invoked debates about the 
perceived relationship(s) between feminism and popular culture which have a long history, 
particularly in terms of their ‘compatibility’. The first two tweets imply that CBB and 
feminism are antithetical, either because feminism is too ‘boring’ and ‘political’, or because 
the nature the format is exploitative and unethical (making it entirely inappropriate for this 
theme). In contrast, the third tweet offers support for CBB – and crucially the talk 
surrounding CBB -  as a popular forum within which debates about gender politics can be 
illuminated and worked through.  
 
Over the last decade, feminist research has invested considerable attention in the analysis of 
popular feminism, and its implications for feminist visibility, activism and scholarship 
(Banet-Weiser and Portwood-Stacer, 2017: 884; Gill, 2007a; 2016; Waters and Gillis, 2011; 
Waters and Munford, 2014). This is not least of all because - as Banet-Weiser and Portwood-
Stacer observe - ‘feminism has always been a useful lens through which to understand 
popular culture. However, we now are living in a moment when feminism has undeniably 
become popular culture [original emphasis]’ (2017: 884). But despite this recognition, 
academic debates can still reproduce the idea that popular manifestations of feminism should 
be ‘measured up against the “real thing”’ (Hollows and Moseley, 2006: 10). In this regard, 
such debates retain the implicit or explicit assumption that ‘popular culture could still benefit 
from a “proper” feminist makeover’, and that there is a ‘better’, or more ‘unpopular’ form of 
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feminism just waiting in the wings (Ibid: 10-11). That said, these hierarchies are not easy to 
disrupt and resolve. Feminist scholarship cannot simply withhold judgement about the 
discourses on feminism(s) which are alive in popular culture: this would be antithetical to its 
political project(s) to critique (and intervene in) the material and discursive contexts of 
gender inequality (Gill, 2007b). But it is to suggest that some of the most high-profile work 
on popular (mediated) feminism (e.g. Gill, 2007a, 2016) continues to endorse these 
hierarchies in ways which may undervalue change, as well as obfuscate the range and 
complexity of the discourses at work here.  
 
In response to this context, this article undertakes a qualitative analysis of Twitter responses 
to CBB: Year of the Woman, which we suggest offers a productive insight into the 
intersection between celebrity culture, social media ‘talk’ and the current visibility of popular 
feminism.  In recognising the significance of exploring what ‘popular culture can tell us 
about feminism’ - rather than simply what ‘feminists’ thinks about popular culture (Hollows 
and Moseley, 2006: 1) - this article considers what the Twitter  discussion can reveal about 
conceptions of feminism in the contemporary moment. Rather than positioning reality and/or 
celebrity culture as a site of ‘ideological ruin’ for feminism (Wicke, 1994), this involves 
exploring how CBB is discussed in relation to feminism as television, and the ways in which 
this may offer affordances, as well as limitations. In order to do this the article asks: what can 
Twitter responses to CBB suggest about the apparent ‘ascendance’ of popular feminism in the 
contemporary cultural moment? What do these responses suggest about how CBB functions 
as a space for debating, rejecting and using ‘feminism(s)’, and how do users negotiate these 
discourses in relation to the programme’s format and the (perceived) demands of the 
‘popular’?  
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Popular feminism 
Popular feminism can be conceived of as the representations of feminism within popular 
culture and the ‘popular understanding[s] of “feminism” that [are]… generated through this 
exchange’ (Glitre, 2011: 17). But whilst popular feminism has been seen as enjoying 
increased visibility and ascendency over the last few years, the extent to which this marks a 
significant break with the past – particularly with respect to the currency of postfeminism - 
has been subject to debate. Postfeminism has been variously understood as a form of 
backlash against feminism (Faludi, 1992); a set of discursive manoeuvres in which feminism 
is ‘taken into account’ and rendered passe in relation to neoliberal claims of female success, 
freedom and individualisation (McRobbie, 2009; Scharff, 2012), or a complex constellation 
which incorporates the mainstreaming of feminism alongside virulent constructions of 
misogyny and anti-feminism (Gill, 2007b, Gill, 2016). As such, the apparent contrast 
between ‘then’ and ‘now’ depends on which paradigm of postfeminism is being explored.  
 
In 2016 Rosalind Gill revisited the arguments made in her canonical ‘Postfeminism as a 
Sensibility’ (2007a), suggesting that claims to the possible redundancy of the concept were 
premature. Gill argued for the need to interrogate the ‘profoundly uneven’ visibilities of 
different constructions of feminism (614), and found that the most visible discourses 
continued to favour constructions of feminism compatible with ‘choice’, individualism and 
neoliberal consumer culture (see also Rottenberg, 2014), as well the promotion of a 
‘commodity/ style’ feminism attached to celebrity culture. These terrains clearly overlap, and 
some scholars characterise them interchangeably (e.g. Keller and Ringrose, 2015: 132). But 
Gill’s characterisation of commodity feminism refers to the appropriation of feminist 
discourses and icons ‘emptied of their political significance and offered back to the public in 
a commodified form’ (2008). In this regard, ‘feminist’ identities, discourses and slogans, and 
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especially the circulation of these by celebrities, have contributed to the construction of a ‘hot 
feminism’ which transforms being a feminist from a ‘derided and repudiated identity… to 
[a]… desirable and stylish one’ (Gill, 2016: 618). In addition to the promotion of 
consumption, this strand is notable for its enduring investment in heterosexuality, its ‘affect 
policing’ (it is resolutely not angry), as well as its general ‘contentlessness’ (Ibid). Although 
Gill acknowledges that celebrity statements about feminism can have significant cultural 
impact, she suggests that we hold on to the idea that claiming a ‘feminist identity—without 
specifying what that means in terms of some kind of politics—is problematic’ ([original 
italics]: 2016: 619). 
 
Gill’s point here seems incontrovertible, and her analysis is useful, nuanced and sobering 
when read in relation to the apparent prominence of feminism within the popular media 
landscape.  But it also crystallises long-standing tensions in the perceived relationships 
between academic and ‘popular’ feminism, even whilst these spheres are recognised as 
irrevocably intertwined. In addition, although there is a long history of qualitative work 
exploring how girls/ women understand feminism as a cultural category (e.g. Budgeon, 2001, 
Quinn and Radtke, 2006; Riley and Scharff, 2012;  Scharff, 2011; 2012), the most visible 
research on the current moment focuses on media discourse, rather than on how such 
constructions are negotiated or used (for an exception, see Keller and Ringrose, 2015). Given 
that work on media audiences has long since argued that we cannot assume meaning based on 
the analysis of the text alone (Gillespie, 2005), this omission is problematic. As such,  
although analysing popular media constructions of feminism is crucial, we also need to give 
due attention to the ‘active making of meaning and contestation’ which is undertaken by 
media audiences (Hamad and Taylor, 2015:  125).  
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Twitter, Feminism and Reality TV 
Over the last 20 years, feminist research has examined the relationships between gender, 
feminism and new media technologies, subjecting the apparently ‘transformative potential’ of 
online communication to close scrutiny (Kim, 2017; Orgad, 2005). Feminist scholarship has 
explored the construction and circulation of popular misogyny (Banet-Weiser and Miltner, 
2016; Jane, 2014); the risks of speaking out as ‘feminist’ online (Cole, 2015), and how online 
spaces can afford the possibilities of feminist resistance, critique and collectivity (Keller, 
Mendes and Ringrose, 2018; Kim, 2017; Rentschler; 2015). Within this context, forms of 
digital feminist activism have arguably fared better as examples of ‘popular’ feminism, and 
are often implicitly/ explicitly positioned as complicating the constructions of feminism 
typified by postfeminist, neoliberal discourses (Gill, 2016; Keller, Mendes and Ringrose, 
2018; Kim, 2017; Rentschler, 2015). Such a focus on activism is clearly important, but it may 
also miss other everyday exchanges in which the possibilities and uses of contemporary 
feminism are played out - including the discussion of popular television.  This is particularly 
so given that the scholarly discussion of TV texts which appear to lay claim to (‘knowing’) 
relations with feminism invariably focus on ‘quality’ drama (e.g. Orange is the New Black  
(Kalogeropoulos Householder and Trier-Bieniek, 2016); Girls (Bell, 2013; Woods, 2015)) 
rather than on the less prestigious terrain of reality TV.  
Aside from judgements of cultural value, this may be indicative of the extent to which reality 
TV has been seen as having uneasy relations with feminist politics (see Weber, 2014). 
Indeed, although there are a vast range of formats and sub-types to consider here, reality 
programmes have often been understood by feminist scholars as reinscribing gender norms 
(e.g. Johnston, 2009; Sears and Godderis, 2013; Stephens, 2014), and they have been 
conceptualised as a prime site for articulating neoliberal/postfeminist discourses on 
individualism, competition and personal responsibility (e.g. Dubrofsky, 2009; Ouellette & 
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Hay, 2006; Patterson, 2015). Just as crucially, feminist criticism has also observed how 
reality formats can be inhospitable environments for women, with female contestants in 
particular held up as the spectacular foci of controversy, judgement or ridicule (Holmes and 
Jermyn, 2014, Skeggs and Wood, 2012; Weber, 2014). At the same time, it is notable that the 
high profile reality formats in the British context, such as Big Brother (2000-, UK), CBB 
(2001-, UK), The X Factor (2004-, UK), I’m a Celebrity… Get Me Out of Here! (2002-, UK) 
and Strictly Come Dancing (2004-, UK), have featured comparatively little in feminist 
scholarship, with feminist scholars more inclined to write about programmes with overtly 
gendered premises (such as dating, makeover, relationship or birthing shows) (Banet-Weiser 
and Portwood-Stacer, 2006; Ringrose and Walkerdine, 2008, Sears and Godderis, 2011).  
 
CBB UK began in 2001 as a one-off series capitalising on the success of Big Brother, and it 
has historically included international/ national film, TV and music stars (albeit it those who 
are past their ‘prime’), alongside British and American reality TV contestants (Bleakly, 2016: 
421). The programme received a clear spike in academic and popular visibility following the 
notorious ‘race row’ in 2007 – when Jade Goody, Danielle Lloyd and Jo O-Meara were 
widely seen as having expressed racist attitudes toward the Bollywood actress Shilpa Shetty 
(see summary in Palasinski et al, 2011). However, outside of this, and despite the 
programme’s history of igniting debates about misogyny, sexism, racism and homophobia 
(Lovelock, 2015), there has been little research analysing the programme’s significance as a 
‘trigger of everyday political talk’ (Graham and Hajru, 2011: 24) – an omission that this 
article seeks to address.  
 
Methodology 
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The use of Twitter to explore interactions with television programmes has expanded rapidly 
within TV Studies (Deller, 2011; Wood and Baughman, 2012). As an online micro-blogging, 
social networking, marketing and news site, Twitter enables users to communicate in short 
messages (tweets) of 280 characters or less (a recent development after the 140 character 
limited was doubled). In the programme and online, CBB uses the hashtag #CBB to 
encourage conversation about the series. Although this was clearly not the only hashtag used 
to tweet about CBB, it was adopted by the authors as a means of narrowing down a vast pool 
of Twitter data. Searches for #CBB were undertaken within the date range of the 
programme’s run (2 January-3 February), and following a preliminary scoping exercise to 
identify suitable key words, the hashtag was combined with keywords/ phrases including 
‘Year of the woman’, ‘gender’, ‘girl power’, ‘feminism’, ‘feminist’, ‘empowerment’ and 
‘misogyny’. This generated a total of 1042 tweets, which were then extracted and placed in a 
spreadsheet before being analysed via thematic discourse analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
 
Thematic discourse analysis is an approach that seeks to identify, analyse and report patterns 
within qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Discourse analysis covers a range of 
language-orientated approaches, but is particularly concerned with how language constructs 
‘reality’ within wider relations of power (Weedon, 1987). This study is interested in how the 
potential relations between feminism and CBB are constructed discursively, rather than 
seeking to ‘measure’ such responses in relation to a pre-given definition of what feminism 
‘actually’ is (see also Scharff, 2011). As such, and in recognising feminism as a cultural 
category, it is understood that negotiations of feminism are contradictory and contingent, as 
well as shaped by the particular context(s) of their articulation (Quinn and Radtke, 2006). 
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The data was approached using the process for thematic analysis defined by Braun and 
Clarke (2006).  The first stage involved the authors familiarizing themselves with the Twitter 
data, so the tweets were read and re-read independently to produce separate notes on 
preliminary observations. Second, this process was used by each author to generate initial 
codes across the full data set. Third, these initial codes were then checked and cross-checked 
between the authors so as to generate broader thematic categories, with the key criteria being 
the prevalence of such themes within the sample. Examples of thematic categories identified 
by the authors were perceptions of CBB as ‘sexist toward men’, CBB as ‘anti-feminist’ (and 
perpetuating sexism and misogyny), the format of CBB as antithetical/ conducive to the 
exploration of gender and power; perceptions of CBB as ‘boring television’/ ‘brilliant 
television’, debate over ‘who might win’ (and what this would say about British society), and 
discussions of ‘victim-blaming’ in relation to rape culture. The thematic categories were then 
analysed in detail and data extracts which represented these themes (as well as the 
complexities and contradictions within them) were selected for inclusion. The writing stage 
then involved placing these themes in relation to the research questions and the literature on 
popular feminism and popular culture.  
 
Although Twitter represents a readily accessible form of audience research data, it clearly 
also has its limitations as a source of evidence (Deller, 2011). Aside from posts being 
restricted in length, Twitter doesn’t represent ‘what the audience of a particular programme… 
are thinking’ (Deller, 2011), nor is it an ‘objective’ and generalizable terrain for gauging 
attitudes toward popular feminism. As feminist research has explored, whilst Twitter may 
offer particular affordances in terms of feminist discussion and activism (Keller et al, 2018; 
Kim 2017, Rentschler, 2015), it is also an arena – along with other online spaces – which 
may facilitate heightened forms of misogyny (Cole, 2015; Banet-Weiser and Miltner, 2016). 
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In addition, and as with many forms of online data, tweets offer little clue as to demographic 
background of participants, and although Twitter handles often contain indications of gender, 
these should be used with caution in terms of their ‘authenticity’ and verifiability. It is also 
recognised here that here are ethical issues at stake in conducting social media research 
(Williams, Burnap and Sloan, 2017), and although often treated as ‘public data’ (and 
Twitter’s terms of service support this definition (Twitter, 2018)), concern has been 
expressed that the use of Tweets in academic research may exceed users’ expectations in 
potentially problematic ways (Ibid). Although the authors sought ethical approval from the 
University ethics committee for this research (approved by [anonymised for review purposes] 
24/04/18) rather than informed consent from the users, they acknowledge these concerns, and 
do not provide details of Twitter handles (usernames) for the tweets in this study.  
 
CBB: ‘Year of the Woman’ 
On the opening night of CBB, the programme greeted eight female housemates including: 
former Tory MP Anne Widdecombe, Daily Mail journalist Rachel Johnson; the UK’s ‘first 
transgender newsreader’ India Willoughby, US reality star Malika Haaq (Keeping up with the 
Kardashians (2007-, US), veteran soap actress Amanda Barrie, DJ and social media 
‘influencer’ Ashley James, reality star and glamour model Jess Impiazzi, and former police 
officer (and ‘whistle-blower’ in the Rochdale child-grooming scandal), Maggie Oliver. The 
female housemates were then joined by eight men (four days into the series) including ex-
footballer and TV presenter John Barnes, ex-ballet dancer Wayne Sleep, Boyzone singer 
Shane Lynch, American hip-hop star ‘Ginuwine’, reality TV contestants Jonny Mitchell and 
Andrew Brady, comedian Dapper Laughs (Daniel O’Reilly), and Australian TV personality/ 
drag queen Shane Jenek, better known under the stage name of ‘Courtney Act’ (from his time 
as a contestant on season 6 of Ru Paul’s Drag Race (2014, US)). 
12 
 
 
 In terms of the programme’s theme, CBB included a series of tasks intended to explore 
questions of gender and it was often constructed in terms of a ‘battle of the sexes’ discourse. 
The tasks included the women competing to showcase traditionally ‘masculine’ skills such as 
connecting circuit boards or changing car tyres, as well as the housemates competing in 
gender segregated teams to explore skills that have historically been constructed in gendered 
ways. Other tasks involved the housemates participating in a mock TV panel show entitled 
Year of the Woman which debated such topics as equal pay, sexual double standards and 
female role models. The theme of the programme also prompted a number of discussions 
about gender politics which were not linked to particular tasks ranging across such topics as 
working mothers; glamour modelling; gender discrimination in the workplace; transgender 
identity and gendered pronouns, and the sexual harassment scandals involving Hollywood 
mogul Harvey Weinstein. Rather than the set tasks (which were widely panned as trading in 
normative gender stereotypes), it was these conversations which elicited the most substantial 
debate about gender on the CBB Twitter feeds.  
 
In terms of how the programme’s theme was framed, it was never suggested by CBB that all 
the women entering the house identified as ‘feminist.’ In the vignettes which introduced the 
women, only Rachel Johnson and Ashley James openly identified as feminist, whilst others, 
such as Anne Widdecombe, made clear that they did not (and this range of perspectives was 
also mirrored in the introduction of the male celebrities). In this regard, and unlike the ‘self-
professed’ feminist celebrities analysed in other academic studies (Hamad and Taylor, 2015), 
the participants did not all claim to identify as feminist, either prior to entering the house, or 
during the series run. Rather, in drawing upon the well-established reality TV practice of 
casting clashing personalities (Kavka, 2012), CBB offered a space which was set up to debate 
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and explore issues of gender, from which discussions of ‘feminism’ could (and would) 
emerge.  
 
‘Sexist’ and ‘Boring’ (or ‘Loose Women on steroids’) 
It is important to stress at the outset that there was a range of different responses to the 
programme’s theme. Some users were against the programme’s premise and saw it as sexist 
and exclusionary; some supported it but did not like how it was ‘done’ (suggesting that the 
popular format of CBB was an inappropriate context for such discussions); and some 
positioned it as a timely and illuminating intervention into discussions of gender and sexual 
politics. But whilst acknowledging this range, the Twitter sample certainly problematizes the 
idea that feminism now has an uncontested ‘mainstream’ acceptance.  
 
For example, on the opening night, there was vociferous critique of the programme as ‘sexist’ 
toward men – as articulated by users with both male and female Twitter handles: 
You’re celebrating a historical act of equality by segregating and removing men? 
Pankhurst et al would be proud. #cbb (2 January, 2018). 
Im all for girl power and that but if it was a male only house the feminists of the 
land would have a shit fest!! #cbb (2 January, 2018). 
I'm almost semi offended by such a feminist theme on #CBB ... we're not victims, 
we don't need such a fan fare.... such a drama over our sex isn't sitting well with 
me .. IMAGINE if it was 'year of the man' - there would be hell!!! #cbb (2 
January, 2018). 
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The idea of ‘equality’ functions as a ‘rhetorical centrepiece’ here (Edley and Wetherell, 
2001), and is positioned in such a way as to frame feminism as outdated (there is no need for 
it as gender equality has been achieved), as well as ‘unreasonable’ and ‘excessive’ (clearly 
wanting more than ‘just’ equality) (Calder-Dawe and Gavey, 2016). In this regard, these 
tweets attest to the tenacity of anti-feminist ideas, as well as the continued investment in the 
postfeminist rhetoric that equality has already been secured (Anderson, 2015; Gill, 2016, 
McRobbie, 2009; Scharff, 2012).  
Such responses were often consolidated by idea that, as well as being politically problematic, 
CBB was deficient as an entertaining television programme. Referring to an episode in which 
the older female housemates discussed some of the gendered inequalities they had 
encountered as younger women (such as being unable to rent a property as a single, 
unmarried woman, or openly differentiated salary scales for men and women), users on 
Twitter made such comments as:  
#CBB …is focusing too much on the empowerment of women aspect and that’s 
what’s making the show boring. BB shouldn’t be empowering it should be 
entertaining (2 January, 2018). 
Well no point watching Big Brother this Year if unless i just want to hear women 
go on about their problems and moan #cbb (2 January, 2018).  
 
Anyone else fed up already off all this woman power talk… A group of woman 
preaching girl power for the next few days is going to get very boring 
#CelebrityBigBrother #CBB (2 January, 2018). 
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So basically this #CBB is gonna be like an episode of Loose women on steroids 
(2 January, 2018). 
Academic work has questioned the idea that ‘politics’ and ‘entertainment’ are necessarily 
antithetical (Gray, 2008; van Zoonen, 2005) and as discussed, CBB has a longer history of 
engaging popular debate about identity politics and power (Lovelock, 2015). Yet it is clear 
that these users did not see these discourses as primary to the programme’s identity, and the 
2018 series evidently confounded their viewing expectations.  On one hand, the programme 
was dismissed by users as too ‘political’, and it was in fact often compared to more 
‘masculinised’ television referents such as political debate programmes, Channel 4 News, or 
documentaries from ‘BBC Four’. On the other hand, it was denigrated by reference to 
feminised spaces of ‘low’ television culture, and mentions of the ITV1 daytime talk show 
Loose Women (1999-, UK), appeared frequently here. As Jilly Kaye has explored, female 
speech on television - and in culture more widely - is often dismissed by recourse to 
denigrated female speech genres such as ‘gossiping’, ‘nagging’, ‘scolding’ and  ‘ranting’. In 
this regard, the tweets above, and those in the wider sample, recognise the women’s talk as 
political, but in referring to it as ‘moaning’ or ‘preaching’, they delegitimise its status, whilst 
suggesting that it has no place within CBB as reality entertainment.  
There is a longer historical perception that positions feminist critical practice as inhibiting the 
viewer’s pleasure in a text (Ahmed, 2010; Loreck, 2018). Although in terms of CBB, the 
references to boredom and tedium circle around the idea of ‘watching’ feminism (rather than 
understanding it as a way of engaging with a text), a concern over the loss of the ‘usual’ 
viewing pleasures is clear here. As the concept of entertainment is a cultural construction 
(Gray, 2008, van Zoonen, 2005), its meaning(s) shift across different debates in the CBB 
Twitter sample. But in terms of how the dearth of ‘entertainment’ is discussed on the opening 
night,  there appears to be concern that a ‘feminist’ series - and one that was often critiqued in 
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ageist terms as featuring too many ‘oldies’ - may disrupt particular gendered pleasures 
usually associated with the programme. 
 
 Instead of women ‘moaning’ or ‘preaching’, users were apparently anticipating ‘trashy 
reality stars who will piss their pants’ (2 January, 2018), or more talk about ‘who fancies 
who, favourite sexual positions and the like’ (2 January, 2012).  In fact, even those that 
praised the programme’s premise did so because there’s ‘only so much chavvy tramp 
behaviour anyone can cope with’ (2 January 2018). In this regard, the usual ‘pleasures’ 
bemoaned by users were implicitly associated with the inclusion of young, working class, 
female reality celebrities – whose bodies and identities were anticipated as the site of  
‘entertainment’ and judgement within reality TV (Skeggs and Wood, 2012; Walkerdine, 
2011). In this regard, and if linked back to the perception of CBB as a ‘feminist’ series, the 
young working-class woman is implicitly positioned as antithetical to ‘feminism’, which is 
conversely imagined as ‘intelligent’, ‘middle-class’, ‘boring’ and ‘old’. This contributes to 
the idea of feminism as outdated and outmoded (something relevant only to previous 
generations), whilst – in class terms - it also points to historical perceptions of feminism as 
elite and exclusionary (see Budgeon, 2011; Skeggs, 1997).  
 
 ‘Brilliant’ television: entertaining politics 
Yet as discussed earlier on, even if the discourses of sexism and ‘boredom’ were particularly 
apparent on the opening night, the programme’s theme garnered a range of different 
responses on Twitter. For example, there was also a persistent pushback against the dismissal 
of the programme’s premise, and thus the dismissal of feminism more widely. Some tweets 
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questioned the idea that CBB was the ‘wrong’ place to explore contemporary gender politics, 
or that such a theme necessarily made for ‘poor’ television: 
 
This season is responsible for some of the most real, important convo in recent 
#cbb history (16 January, 2018).  
 
This series is BRILLIANT… ! Best one in ages! Reminds me of the old BB's 
where it's thoughtful discussion and not petty arguments 24/7 #cbb (3 January 
2018).  
 
Hope the footage from these interesting conversations is used well. The backlash 
on here is telling... #CBB (2 January, 2018).  
 
These users above challenge the idea that entertaining or indeed ‘brilliant’ television is 
antithetical to the exploration of gender politics, and there is a reframing of the women’s talk  
 that was elsewhere dismissed on the Twitter feeds (‘thoughtful discussion’, ‘interesting 
conversation’, ‘important convo’). In the last tweet, the user also foregrounds the discussion 
on Twitter as part of the discursive insights into gender offered by the programme, reframing 
the objections to its ‘sexist’ premise as less reasonable responses than evidence of a 
(patriarchal) ‘backlash’. 
  
As indicated above, the users expressing support for the theme were also those likely to 
question the redundancy of feminism as a concept or movement. In response to the question  
‘Why is it socially acceptable to be so outrightly sexist against males?!’ (2 January, 2018), 
one user replied: 
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I don’t know. Maybe go back in time and ask all your female family members 
who never got to vote. Never got equal pay. Never able to find Work because 
they also wanted children. Never able to be doctors. Never able to be politicians. 
Never got credit for the work they did (2 January, 2018).  
Although the reference to going ‘back in time’ might be read as suggesting that all is now 
equal (again positioning feminism as ‘past’ and redundant), such conversations frequently led 
to debates about existing gender inequalities on a number of different levels. Indeed, 
discussion on the CBB Twitter feeds ranged across a number of issues pertinent to feminism, 
taking in the gender pay gap, working mothers and victim-blaming in relation to rape culture 
(see below).  These conversations repeatedly framed feminism as entirely ‘necessary’, and a 
critical practice that seeks to tackle the gendered disparities which continue to affect women 
and girls in disproportionate ways (Calder-Dawe and Gavey, 2016).  
For example, when housemate Jonny Mitchell suggested that feminism had gone ‘too far’ and 
that gendered inequalities no longer existed in the UK, there were heated debates on Twitter 
about the validity of his statement. As one user asked in an incredulous tone:‘[H]ang on for 
one little moment…. he said he thinks women have more opportunities than men [?]’ (5 
January, 2018). After being challenged to explain ‘what disadvantages [do] women as a 
group have in the UK just because they are women?’ (5 January, 2018), the user entered into 
a lively debate about gender inequalities (which took in the gender pay gap, as well as the 
representation of women in political office). But when unable to convince the other user of 
the validity of her claims she declared:  
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Won’t be provoking anything here babe, instead of purposely acting illiterate 
google ‘female disadvantages in the uk’ and pick your choice from the workplace 
to ideological expectations, happy new year xxxx (5 January, 2018).  
In calling attention to structural inequalities of gender, it would be difficult to describe such 
discussions, and those that we explore below, as operating solely in terms of the 
individualising rhetoric of neoliberal feminism or the ‘contentlessness’ of commodity 
feminism (Gill, 2016; Rottenberg, 2014). These debates do not necessarily draw upon 
conceptions of feminism which disavow the structural roots of gender inequality ‘in favour of 
the neoliberal ethos of individual action, personal responsibility, and unencumbered choice’ 
(Keller and Ringrose, 2015: 132). Rather, they arguably draw attention to the multiple sites of 
gendered inequity and disadvantage which remain pervasive in the UK, and they remain firm 
and confident in their pronouncement.  
At the same time, we might note how the user is effectively ‘bowing’ out of the conversation 
in her tweet above. Research on speaking out as feminist online has drawn attention to the 
bid to ‘discipline feminists into silence’, including violent expressions of anti-feminist 
engagement (Cole, 2015: 357). Although the user is not threatened here - and they clearly 
speak back - there is a sense in which their views are challenged to the point at which they 
leave the thread (and the phrase ‘won’t be provoking anything here babe’ might be read as 
suggesting weariness and familiarity with such resistance, and an acknowledgement that she 
will not change the other user’s mind). In this regard, although there was a persistent strain of 
voices speaking out as feminist on the CBB threads, this clearly carried risk and attracted 
scrutiny, whilst also garnering accusations of  being overly ‘PC’ or a ‘feminist killjoy’ 
(Ahmed, 2010). As one user retorted, ‘I was making a joke are you are still burning your bra 
[?]’. Self-identified feminists were tweeting about CBB - critiquing the dismissal of 
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feminism, and talking about the persistence of structural gender inequalities in the current 
climate. But these discourses were also policed with a disdain for being ‘angry’, ‘difficult’ or 
‘humourless’ (Gill, 2016: 618), and ‘feminist’ tweets were arguably subject to more scrutiny 
and debate than those containing racist, misogynist or transphobic comments. 
 ‘Was Harvey Weinstein too expensive?’: formatting feminism 
In addition to those who dismissed the premise of the programme (and the need for 
feminism) and those who strongly supported it, there were others who were concerned about 
CBB as a popular context for the theme – thus referencing familiar debates about ‘what 
happens to feminism within popular culture’ (Hollows and Moseley, 2006: 2). In its 
invocation of the centenary of women’s suffrage for example, CBB attracted unfavourable 
comparisons with this historical anchor, and a perceived ‘mismatch’ between feminism and 
CBB was made clear in such comments as: 
 
I don't think voting for who gets evicted into an Elstree car park was what the 
suffragettes were fighting for #cbb (2 January, 2018). 
 
Others questioned whether the female celebrities in the programme were the appropriate 
conduits for the theme. Judgements around the ‘authenticity’ of the self shape audience 
engagement with celebrities (Dyer, 1979;  Turner, 2004) and reality contestants, and both 
beckon a search for the ‘real’ (self) within what are understood as highly performative 
environments (Hill, 2005). The authenticity’ of the women’s relations with feminism were 
often subject to dispute and challenge: 
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Every housemate this year - I'm so glad I can use female empowerment as a 
reason for doing this show. That way nobody will think it's about the money. It's 
about feminism #CBB [original emphasis] (2 January, 2018).  
 
Critiques of the commodification/ celebritsation of feminism also concern the privileging of 
white, middle-class female voices (Hollows and Moseley 2006; Butler, 2013), and the 
perceived lack of intersectionality in the series was raised frequently in the sample: 
 
@bbuk I mean only one black women and not on disabled woman in this line up 
that’s meant to represent the empowerment of women? Feminism isn’t just about 
the middle class white woman  #cbb (2 January, 2018).  
 
The lack of ethnic diversity was often mentioned in this regard, and was linked to what was 
seen as the continued media dominance of ‘peak white feminism’ - a critique which has 
gathered increasing visibility since the second wave (see Budgeon, 2011, Butler, 2013). In 
this respect, although in a different way to the users who wanted to see ‘trashy reality stars 
piss their pants’, there is again a perception here that ‘feminism’ on CBB is the province of 
privilege, power and exclusion.  
 But in this respect it was clear that some inequalities were more visible (and ‘acceptable’) 
than others. For example, although much debate on Twitter was prompted by the inclusion of 
the transgender newsreader India Willoughby, she was not generally talked about in the 
sample (nor welcomed) as an example of intersectionality. Attesting to the apparently 
‘acceptable’ face of transphobia on these Twitter feeds, as well as the fraught and contested 
relations between trans identity and contemporary feminist theory, activism and discourse 
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(see Hines, 2017), the conversation simply circulated around India’s right to ‘be’ a woman, 
and thus the extent to which she ‘qualified’ to be in the house at all.  
 
The housemates were specifically asked to discuss what ‘it meant to be a woman in 2018’, 
with the anticipation that Willoughby would clash with the views of other housemates, such 
as those of traditionalist Anne Widdecombe. Accused both inside and outside the house of 
anti-feminist views, homophobia and transphobia, it was Widdecombe, along with Dapper 
Laughs, who was critiqued as the most problematic ‘casting’ choice in relation to the 
programme’s theme. Whilst tweets complained that Anne ‘rolled her eyes at the sheer 
mention of feminism’ (2 February, 2018) and frequently insisted that feminism had gone ‘too 
far’, others foregrounded the mismatch between the history of her political views and the 
theme of this year’s CBB: 
Let’s kick off this empowering women’s edition of #cbb by getting Anne 
Widdecombe in the diary room to ask her why she defended the Government's 
policy to shackle pregnant prisoners with handcuffs and chains when in hospital 
receiving ante-natal care #cbb (2 January, 2018).  
Users often had even stronger views on the inclusion of Dapper Laughs – who had a 
controversial history of sexist and misogynist humour: 
I think @channel5_tv should be utterly ashamed … announcing an all-female 
#CBB and then 'spicing it up' by sending in a rape apologist #cbb (4 January, 
2018).  
I gather the theme of this year's "Celebrity" Big Brother is 'Year of the Woman' - 
and then they decide to throw Dapper Laughs into the mix. Was Harvey 
Weinstein too expensive? #CBB (4 January, 2018). 
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The casting of ‘intimate strangers’ (Kavka, 2012) and clashing personalities is clearly an 
established trope of reality TV, and it enables producers to have some control over the 
narrative world before filming begins (Deery, 2015; Kavka, 2012: 81). These ‘pre-coded 
conflicts’ often emerge from social and ideological differences, and provide volatile terrains 
for narrative action (Kavka, 2012: 82). But as Kavka observes, in setting up  ‘racial, sexual 
and socio-political flashpoints by casting participants as the raw material for dramatic 
narratives’, these scenarios involve ethical as well as political considerations (2012: 82) – as 
the tweets above clearly suggest.  
 
Others suggested that the moral and ethical responsibilities of the programme went 
considerably further than casting decisions, and insisted that CBB was actively perpetuating 
misogyny:  
#CBB should shine a light on misogyny (and add drama) by playing the house the 
#cbbdaniel [Dapper Laughs] sexist ‘lad’ conversations with the boys and allow 
the women to speak their minds. Hiding his behavior while [the female 
housemates vote to] … save him is complicit and goes against the point of the 
season #cbbuk (22 January, 2018).  
Really tired of the entire crew of @bbuk glorifying ann. yes, she's providing 
some comical moments but that doesn't excuse the awful views and her complete 
self righteousness. her winning 'year of the woman' would be a JOKE considering 
her views on feminism & abuse. #CBB #CBBBOTS [12 January, 2018) 
The first tweet does not position entertainment and politics as antithetical (it can both ‘shine a 
light’ and ‘add drama’). But it does suggest that, in this instance, the aesthetic and narrative 
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construction of CBB is ‘complicit’ in the endorsement of misogyny. In terms of 
Widdecombe, it is difficult to know precisely what the user is referring to as ‘glorification’. 
But as well as featuring her attitudes toward gay marriage and her views on feminism, the 
programme certainly included a number of conversations in which housemates expressed 
respect for her apparently congruent and ‘transparent’ self – offering a model of ‘authentic’ 
personhood that has historically been praised by reality TV (Holmes, 2004).  
Yet although it would be problematic to conceive of CBB as simply offering the ‘“raw 
material” from which a range of conclusions could be drawn and a variety of narratives 
constructed’ (to echo claims historically made by the production team) (Tincknell and 
Raghuram, 2004: 257), there were clearly divergent responses on Twitter to what the 
programme was ‘doing’ with gender here: 
The great thing about #CBB Year of the Woman, is that it's clearly demonstrating 
that women are NOT a monolith. Women can perpetuate misogyny. Women can 
harm other women. Women come in all shapes, sizes, and have every opinion 
under the sun. Brilliant television (28 January, 2018).  
I’ve been watching this season of #cbb, it’s been quite fascinating re: gender 
issues. The absolute glut of misogyny, the depressing … attitudes of 
Widdecombe, and the frankly remarkable patience of @courtneyact (1 February, 
2018). 
In these responses, the programme is seen less as condoning or perpetuating misogyny than 
actively highlighting and exploring it. But whether the programme was seen as perpetuating 
or exposing misogyny, CBB appeared to provide a terrain upon which viewers could debate 
and critique such attitudes (see also Kavka, 2012: 83) – often linking the discourses to real-
world contexts and experiences. 
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CBB, feminism, citizenship 
For example, early on in the series before the male housemates arrived, some of the 
celebrities discussed the sexual harassment/ assault charges levied at Harvey Weinstein – the 
figure invoked above to attest to the programme’s questionable moral code. Two of the older 
housemates in particular – Anne Widdecombe and Amanda Barrie – questioned the basis of 
the allegations, suggesting that women had the choice to decline his advances and walk away. 
This then generated a slew of angry responses on Twitter which specifically situated and 
critiqued the conversation as an example of victim-blaming discourse:  
 
Amanda and Ann’s comments on Harvey Weinstein’s VICTIMS were an 
absolute disgrace! He is accused of sexually assaulting & raping women. Ann 
said they had a choice?! She should be ejected from the house immediately… 
#cbb #Victimshaming #metoo (3 January, 2018).  
Why is nobody saying that actresses should never have been put in a position in 
the first place where they had to choose between giving up a part they were 
worthy of or having sex with Weinstein?! What is Anne taking about? 
#CelebrityBigBrother #cbb (3 January, 2018). 
What choice did the victims have when he whacked his dick out in front of them 
and started masturbating? Haven’t you heard the recording of the victim 
repeatedly saying no? Do your research! (3 January, 2018). 
These tweets were responding to the on-screen conversation, as well as the ensuing debate on 
the Twitter feeds, in which a minority of users made distinctions between ‘real’ sexual assault 
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and the ‘normative’ expectations of the ‘casting couch’. In response, the tweets above clearly 
name the acts as assault and rape, question the rhetoric of choice, and invoke the online 
movement #MeToo - the hashtag used to demonstrate the prevalence of sexual harassment 
and assault shortly after the allegations surrounding Weinstein emerged (see Cobb and 
Horeck, 2018). Although the bid to push back against victim-blaming is far from new within 
feminist discourse and activism (see Anderson, 2015), such resistance has gained increasing 
visibility via the SlutWalk campaigns (2011-) (Mendes, 2015), and the media visibility of 
#MeToo.ii Rather than simply insisting that victim-blaming is unacceptable and ‘wrong’ (see 
Mendes, 2015: 94), the tweets lay the blame squarely with the perpetrator, and they ‘revisit’ 
the dynamics of the assault in order to refute claims to agency and ‘choice’. Indeed, the last 
tweet in particular seeks to challenge victim-blaming discourse by invoking a scenario of 
sexual assault– its evocative and shocking imagery foreclosing the idea that agency should 
even be debated here. As such, in extending the purchase of the #MeToo debate in relation to 
particular conversations in CBB, these discourses do not collude with the feminist neoliberal 
discourse of ‘individual action, personal responsibility, and unencumbered choice as the best 
strategy to produce gender equality’ (Keller and Ringrose, 2016: 132).  
Emerging feminist scholarship on the ‘post-Weinstein’ era (Cobb and Horeck, 2018) is 
seeking to address the new visibility of long-standing feminist arguments about gender 
inequalities in the workplace and the patriarchal dynamics of rape culture, as well as explore 
the limitations of these discourses, and the degree to which they will engender any long-term 
change (see Ibid). Such interrogation is clearly vital, but as discussed in the framing of this 
article, it remains important to look at what changes we have seen in popular feminism, rather 
focusing primarily on what is ‘missing’ or not there. In relation to the tweets about CBB, 
viewers were using the programme to engage in debate about the patriarchal dynamics of 
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rape culture and crucially, what have passed as ‘acceptable’ attitudes toward such abuses of 
power.  
Just as the #MeToo movement traversed the boundary between the celebrity and the 
‘ordinary’, the spectacular and the everyday, so these debates were frequently positioned on a 
continuum with ‘everyday’ actions unfolding in the house. For example, in questioning a 
series of comments which defended the ‘laddish’ and sexist behaviour of the younger male 
housemates, one user commented: 
Lads if you think Andrew, Jonny and Daniel's discourse about women is ok then 
you are part of the problem. It's not OK #cbb (17 January, 2018).  
In examining the ways in which reality TV can become a trigger for political talk, Graham 
and Hajru observe how reality TV forums are ‘an important object for research since they 
address us … as participants of debate, as users of social media, as audiences of television 
programmes and as citizens … (2011: 29). Existing research has indeed explored how reality 
TV works over questions of cultural citizenship (e.g. Coleman, 2006;  Gray, 2008; Ouellette 
and Hay, 2008; van Zoonen, 2005). In particular, although popular conceptions of reality 
programmes (especially those with participatory mechanisms) may invoke ‘caricature[s] of 
the dumbed-down …  viewer, distracted by the trivia of televized reality from any 
engagement with the real world’ (Coleman, 2006: 459), scholarship has questioned this 
traditional binary of the ‘citizen’/ ‘consumer’, and explored how mediated experiences can 
offer forms of civic participation (Ibid). Indeed, as CBB progressed and viewers began to 
debate who might go on to win, there was repeated recourse to the audience as ‘public’, both 
in terms of the programme’s outcome and the specificity of its theme. With Widdecombe and 
Shane Jenek/ Courtney Act emerging as the final two housemates, users tweeted such 
comments as: 
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Oh god, so [it]…  comes down to a finale which includes a woman who doesn’t 
believe in feminism, gay marriage and women priests, please, please let’s see 
Shane/Courtney triumph - I can’t bear it, I’m going to bed, it’s like brexit all over 
again #cbb (2 February, 2018).  
 
In the Year of the Woman, let's not vote for someone who would throw women 
under the bus by putting up a defence for Harvey Weinstein within hours of 
entering the #CBB house! #CBBFinal (2 February, 2018).  
 
These tweets specifically seek to appeal to viewers as citizens to make the ‘right’ voting 
choice, questioning the idea that – when compared to formal politics – the audience has a 
‘relaxed and obligation-free relationship’ with CBB (Coleman, 2006: 460). In this regard, the 
tweets call out what are framed as the ‘antidemocratic tendencies’ of misogyny and 
homophobia (van Zoonen, 2005: 150), and they effectively remind viewers of their civic 
‘duty’ to make the ‘right’ choice when voting (Ibid: 56). In this regard, although 
Widdecombe did not go on to win CBB, there were many tweets that sought to ‘shame’ those 
‘out there’ who had voted for her to remain, specifically in relation to her expressed opinions 
about gender, feminism and LGBT rights: 
Apparently ‘entertainment’ is winning over decency. Apparently homophobia, 
victim blaming rape victims and sexism is funny to watch!! #cbb (2 February, 
2018). 
 
Yup! I think we've basically found out that #homophobia and #misogyny are real 
crowd pleasers for some #cbb viewers! (2 February, 2018).  
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Questions again arise here about the ‘appropriate’ relationship between CBB, ‘entertainment’, 
and politics. In this instance, the tweets imply that viewers have gleaned misguided pleasures 
from the text and that they have effectively ‘misunderstood’ what the appropriate response 
should have been to Widdecombe’s views (a disparity which returns to the uncertainty about 
whether the programme is highlighting, endorsing or critiquing inequalities). In fact, in 
conflating ‘good citizenship’ with ‘good taste’ (see van Zoonen, 2005: 15)), there is 
something of a contradictory invocation of CBB as a site for popular feminism(s) here. On 
one level, the programme is positioned as raising issues of civic importance upon which 
‘feminism’ should intervene (and the extent to which a ‘feminist’ point of view is situated as 
‘common sense’ here clearly contrasts with the lack of legitimacy afforded to feminism in the 
tweets on the opening night). On the other hand, there is again the implication that CBB has 
not been a ‘safe’ or appropriate terrain upon which to explore such important issues, with its 
imagined popular ‘pleasures’ steering the result ‘out of control’ to the point at which online 
intervention is necessary.  
Shane Jenek/ Courtney Act ultimately went on to win the series, and although there was some 
complaint on Twitter that a female contestant should have won ‘Year of the Woman’, the 
outcome was eagerly praised by many: 
There couldn't be a better winner of year of the woman than a polyamorous 
genderqueer drag queen tbh. #CBB (2 February, 2018). 
 
I personally think the perfect ending to #CBB 'year of the woman' is the fact that 
Courtney has won! A celebration of how wonderfully accepting our country is to 
everyone - man, woman, trans, gay, straight or bi! high five public! Great choice! 
@bbuk (2 February, 2018). 
30 
 
It is clearly problematic to suggest a neat equation between the outcome of a reality 
programme and the existence of a tolerant and ‘progressive’ society: the sample of tweets 
analysed here would question the idea of a ‘wonderfully accepting’ public (and the early 
ejection and treatment of Willoughby as a trans woman is effectively written out of this 
narrative). Nevertheless, within the programme itself, the winner had openly identified as 
feminist, raised questions about intersectionality, discussed the nuances of transvestitism and 
transgender identification, and challenged Widdecombe’s pronouncements that gender 
equality had been achieved. As such, there was a sense in which Jenek/ Act emerged as a 
worthy winner in relation to the programme’s theme. At the same time, it is important to 
recognise how this ‘acceptance’ still assumed constructions of ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ 
feminism which pivoted on the idea of ‘equality for all’ – a discourse which simultaneously 
activates the perception of feminism as (otherwise) inegalitarian and selfishly ‘women 
focussed’ (Tyler, 2007, cited in Calder-Dawe and Gavey, 2016: 493). This is particularly so 
given that the two women to openly identify as feminist (and who invoked discussion of the 
inequalities faced by women), received a far less accepting reaction. Rachel Johnston was 
evicted early on - second only to Willoughby – and Ashley James’ feminist identity was 
repeatedly subject to challenge and criticism when the series was on air: 
 
Anyone else clock the irony that after Ashley came in all guns blazing about 
feminism and the year of the woman she has spent her entire time in the house 
OBSESSING about a MAN? #CBB) (15 January, 2018). 
 
 In terms of judgements about the ‘authenticity’ and ‘validity’ of popular feminism(s), this 
returns us to where we began – with the tweets hedging around the issue of what ‘counts’ as 
feminism, and thus who has the right to ‘speak’ as feminist, or claim a feminist identity at all.  
31 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has aimed to examine what a sample of CBB Twitter discourse can tell us about 
the apparent ‘luminosity’ (Gill, 2016) of feminism in the contemporary cultural moment, and 
the ways in which CBB might function as a terrain for the negotiation of popular feminism(s). 
In particular, this article has sought to respond to continued tensions between ‘academic’ and 
‘popular’ feminism, even whilst these discourses are recognised as irrevocably intertwined. 
In doing so, it has aimed to take into account some of the specificities of the programme 
context, and how this shaped the mobilisation of feminism(s) as a cultural category here 
(Quinn and Radtke, 2006). In this regard, it is crucial that these debates emerged from the 
arenas of reality TV and celebrity culture, both of which have been positioned - in popular 
and academic discourse - as having uneasy relationships with feminism (Wicke, 1994, 
Holmes and Jermyn, 2014). 
 
First, the idea that we have moved ‘beyond’ postfeminism would indeed seem to be 
premature, and the data attests to the continued currency of ‘pre-feminist or anti-feminist 
ideas’ in the contemporary cultural moment (Gill, 2016: 622). Particularly in the early days of 
the series, there was a dominant - even ‘common sense’ - discourse that feminism was 
extreme, unfair and sexist, essentially because it was now obsolete (Calder-Dawe and Gavey, 
2016, Scharff, 2011). Although seemingly progressive, the discourse around the outcome of 
the programme also implicitly confirmed the perception of ‘traditional’ feminism (and the 
focus on women’s rights), as ‘unreasonable’, ‘unfair’ and ‘excessive’, and thus something 
that we should now move beyond.  
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However, from the start of the series there was also significant pushback against efforts to 
marginalise or silence feminism, and an emphasis on its continued use value in tackling 
structural gendered disparities which effect women and girls in disproportionate ways 
(Calder-Dawe and Gavey, 2016). To suggest that this simply echoed the individualist 
rhetorical of neoliberal feminism, or the ‘empty’ rhetoric of celebrity/ commodity feminism 
(Gill, 2016), is to simplify and generalise about the nuanced and complex ways in which 
feminism was mobilised here. The talk did, at times, call attention to structural gender 
inequalities, with the Twitter feeds emerging as a way of amplifying, extending and 
deepening issues that were spoken about on screen. Although these were necessarily limited 
in scope and depth (and the character limit on Twitter is certainly a structuring context here), 
they did not simply perpetuate versions of neoliberal feminism in which ‘individual action, 
personal responsibility, and unencumbered choice [are presented] as the best strategy to 
produce gender equality’ (Keller and Ringrose, 2016: 132). In fact, many of the debates 
discussed here push against this prevailing idea of ‘choice’, asking us to think about the ways 
in which women’s agency has been compromised by historical, economic and cultural 
inequities that have been beyond their control.  
 
It is also clear that the Twitter discourse included significant critique of the programme as a 
space for debates about gender politics, suggesting that audiences do not uncritically accept 
the representations of feminism they encounter on screen (see also Keller and Ringrose, 
2015). Such debates can be valuable in themselves given that, as Hollows and Moseley 
observe, ‘[s]truggles in popular culture over the meaning of feminism … may offer a way of 
understanding the limitations of feminism’ (2006: 3). If this is the case here then there 
remains the suggestion that feminism reproduces ‘hierarchies of difference and dominance’ 
(Butler, 2013: 49), particularly in terms of race and class. Equally, the perception that, as a 
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popular reality format, CBB might not be the most conducive environment for debates about 
contemporary gender politics was also a persistent theme in the sample.  Such discussions of 
course still demonstrated the significance of the programme as a site for generating popular 
debate about (and understandings of) feminism. But it is clear that some Twitter users echoed 
concern about whether popular culture may ‘tame’ or ‘corrupt’ what is still often presented as 
feminism proper – suggesting that such hierarchies are not simply the preserve of academic 
discourse. If critiques of popular feminism are now an established part of feminism’s popular 
circulation (Banet-Weiser and Portwood-Stacer, 2017: 885), this in itself raises interesting 
questions about how we approach these discourses as feminist media scholars. If the 
traditional dichotomy was between ‘academic’ and ‘popular’ feminism (hierarchies which, as 
argued, still retain a currency), then what do we do when popular culture making claims to 
feminism comes to us ‘pre-judged’, with concerns already articulated over commodification, 
ethics or intersectionality?  
 
Banet-Weiser and Portwood-Stacer observe of popular feminism that it seems to ‘explicitly 
recognize that inequality exists while stopping short of recognizing, naming, or disrupting the 
political economic conditions that allow that inequality to be profitable’ (2017: 885). It is 
possible to read the Twitter debates explored here as ‘recognising’ and ‘naming’ inequality, 
even if they do not ‘disrupt’ the mechanisms that enable such disparities to flourish. But 
given that feminist media scholarship has also struggled to intervene in these structures,  
it is worth reflecting on whether we may be placing unreasonable expectations on the popular 
here.  
 
The case of CBB suggests the need to look closely at how we can ‘think together’ (Gill, 2016: 
610), the particular structures of a popular cultural text with constructions, understandings 
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and uses of feminism as a cultural category. In this regard, popular media constructions of 
feminism cannot be considered outside the contexts of their reception (which are not always 
predictable nor homogenous).  As feminism achieves more mainstream visibility (even if 
such visibility is ‘uneven’ and contradictory) (Gill, 2016, Hollows and Moseley, 2006), we 
are faced with popular media texts making more explicit claims to connections with 
feminism, as is the case with CBB. In this regard, we need to think about how to approach 
these intersections with nuance and complexity - to keep a keen eye on strategies of 
incorporation and limitation, as well as remain alive to the range of ways in which popular 
feminism can be used and understood. This involves considering how feminism, popular 
media and celebrity culture ‘intersect in ways that may be at once productive and 
unproductive, with constraints and possibilities [our emphasis]’ (Hamad and Taylor, 2015; 
125). In spotlighting these dynamics, CBB is a illustrative example of the complexities of 
contemporary feminism(s), and the problems inherent in simplifying the popular.  
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i The Representation of the People Act was passed in 1918, enabling women over the age of 30 (who met 
minimum property qualifications) to vote.  The Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act (1928) 
extended the right to vote to all women over the age of 21 In Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
ii Although it is important to observe here that the Me Too movement had a longer dating back to 2006 and the 
work of activist Tarana Burke (see Rodino-Colocino, 2018).  
                                                          
